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IX/2
abrogate any constitutional, statutory, or common law
right of the complainants or witnesses who participate in
the complaint procedure. (i.e. reopening criminal
charges previously settled.)
Secton 16-50, That the Board shall prepare and publish a
semi-annual statistical and analytical report regarding
the complaints processed under this Article.
Appendix B - Recommendations of CRC Report -
6/12/78
In light of the refusal of the majority of the Board's
members to comply fully with all portions of Article 16,
Section 41-50, CRC staff has prepared the following
recommendations addressing citizen complaints of
police abuse:
1. Independent body be established and empowered to
receive and investigate citizen allegations of police
abuse. This investigative body shall have the legal access
to all pertinent records, citizen and police personnel
necessary to pursue and process citizen complaints.
Establishment of such a body would remove the investi-
gation of police abuse from its present vulnerability to in
fluence and favoritism by members of one police division
(i.e. IID) investigating police abuse of citizens by
members of other police divisions. For example, the de-
tective assigned to investigate allegations of police abuse
by a citizen may tend to slant his investigation in favor of
the accused police officer, in situations where that detec-
tive is under peer group pressure to advocate on behalf
of the accused officers.
2. A civilian component of the CEB be instituted to sit at
each meeting of the CEB, provide input and comment on
each police complaint case as it comes before the CEB,
their comments be incorporated into the Findings and
Recommendations of the CEB.
3. Each statutory member of the CEB should prepare a
written analysis and recommendations on police abuse
cases, prior to every meeting of the CEB. Through the
process of deliberation, the CEB should arrive at a
recommendation on each case, based upon Findings
adopted by the majority of the Board, as well as the Find-
ings and Recommendations of each statutory member of
the Board who may be in dissent from the majority.
4. There should be clearly defined procedures and
guidelines by which the CEB could hold Hearings on citi-
zen allegations of police abuse. These Hearings would
provide citizens with an alternative to the present system
of investigation by LID. The CEB would then present
Findings and Recommendations to the Police Commis-
sioner based upon Evidence presented at the CEB
Hearings.
5. The Findings and Recommendations of the CEB
should be binding upon the Police Commissioner, unless
the respondent police personnel elects to appeal the de-
cision of the CEB before a Police Trial Board.
Authority of The House
of Representatives
to Expell a Member
by Thomas J. Sehler*
I. INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the historical and legal prece-
dents respecting the power of the House of Representa-
tives to expel one of its Members. There exists no consti-
tutional provision, federal statute, House rule, or
precedent which is totally dispositive of the issue. In-
stances in which the House has expelled Members
number three, all occuring in the 37th Congress.
I!. AUTHORITY
Each respective House of the Congress is given the
power to expel its Members in Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 of the
U.S. Constitution:
Each House-may determine the Rules of its pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a
Member.
In a Library of Congress Multilith entitled "Precedents of
the House of Representatives in Respect to Procedure
for Censure or Expulsion", prepared by Robert L.
Tienken (Dec. 29, 1966), there appears the following
discussion:
There is no judicial process for unseating a Mem-
ber; it is not a function of the Executive; and, it cannot
be achieved through State recall statutes (see Burton
v. U.S., 202 U.S. 344 (1906); In Re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661 (1897)). Even where a statute prescribes that con-
viction for an offense shall bar a person from federal
office, there is no automatic expulsion of a Member.
As the Supreme Court stated in Burton v. U.S.,
supra, P. 369: ". . the final judgment of conviction
[does] not operate, ipso facto, to vacate the seat of [a]
convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel
him or to regard him as expelled by force alone of the
judgment." The decision must be made by the House
involved.
It follows, then, that the House has exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of expulsion of its Members.
The grounds for expulsion are extremely far-reaching.
While the House has been guarded in the use of its power
to expel, Cannon's Precedents of the House of Repre-
sentatives, vol. VI, sec. 78, reveals that "The power of the
House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a matter
purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote,
from which there is no appeal." Included in this prece-
dent, which relates to the South Carolina election case
against Richard S. Whaley in the 63rd Congress, is lan-
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guage cited from the report of the House Committee on
Elections No. 1. The committee report states, in brief,
that (1) the power of expulsion is necessary and inherent
in all legislative bodies; (2) it is a power of protection and
is necessary for the safety of the State; (3) a Member may
commit a crime or do many things which would rendo'r
him ineligible as a Member; (4) the power to expel is in-
valuable; (5) this power may be exercised for misconduct
on the part of a Member committed in any place and
either before or after conviction in a court of law; (6) its
extent seems to be unlimited; and (7) this unlimited
power must be administered fairly with due regard for
the integrity of the House and the rights of the individual
Member affected.
Despite such a clarification of the jurisdiction of the
House and the grounds for expulsion, the pivotal distinc-
tion between the terms "expel" and "exclude" remains
ill-defined. The celebrated case of Powell u.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), fills this void. In Powell
the Supreme Court held that "in judging the qualifica-
tions of its Members [under Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 1] Congress
is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution." These qualifications include: age, United
States citizenship, and State residency requirements in
Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 2 (for Representatives); the taking of an
oath or statement of affirmation to support the Constitu-
tion in Art. VI, cl. 3; no participation by a Member of Con-
gress in rebellion or insurrection against the United
States in Amend. XIV, sec. 3; the prohibition of simul-
taneous service as an officer of the United States and a
member of either House in Art. I, sec. 6, cl. 2. Thus, the
court declared that only in instances where a Member-
elect failed to meet such constitutional standards could
the House exclude him or her from its membership by a
simple majority vote.
However, the Powell case further appears to suggest
that while the House could not exclude Representative
Powell under the circumstances which prevailed at the
time, it may have expelled him by a two-thirds vote (of
those present and voting) after he had been sworn in.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion seems to confirm
this proposition by stating:
By Art. I, sec. 5, the House may "expel a Member"
by a vote of two-thirds. And if this were an expulsion
case I would think that no justiciable controversy
would be presented, the vote of the House being two-
thirds or more. But it is not an expulsion case.
As mentioned above, although the House's power to
expel one of its Members apparently is limitless, Can-
non's Precedents of the House of Representatives. vol.
VI, sec. 238, provides additional insight. This precedent
relates to a case wherein Representative John W. Lan-
gley of Kentucky, while a Member of the 68th congress,
was convicted of conspiracy in the U.S. District Court in
Kentucky. Subsequently, he was reelected to the 69th
Congress in November, 1924 and the U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction
on November 13, 1925. When the 69th Congress con-
vened in December, 1925, a special committee was
created to investigate and recommend. In the meantime,
Representative Langley was not sworn in and did not
participate in the proceedings of the House.
Cannon's, supra, sec. 238, contains language from the
special committee's report to the effect that, customar-
ily, "the House will not expel a Member for reprehensible
action prior to his election as a Member, not even for
conviction for an offense." The term "prior to. . election"
has been interpreted as applying to both incumbent and
new Members and to each Congress separately (i.e.,
conviction in the 68th Congress had no bearing on mem-
bership in the 69th Congress). However, the committee
report went on to provide that the committee was
"strongly of the opinion" that the circumstances did re-
quire action on the part of the House "at the appropriate
time." Such action was delayed specifically because of
the custom of the House to defer the final disposition of
such cases until all appeals had been exhausted. This
position was reaffirmed in the report of the House Com-
mittee on Standards of Official Conduct, In the Matter of
Representative Andrew J. Hinshaw, H. Rep. No. 94-
1477, 94th Congress, 2d session (1976), wherein the
committee states: "Although the presumption of inno-
cence is lost upon conviction, the House could find itself
in an extremely untenable position of having punished a
Member for an act which legally did not occur if the con-
viction is reversed or remanded on appeal."
The precedent set by the Langley case in Cannon's,
supra, sec. 238, concludes with a reference to the fact
that there existed "every prospect of an early disposi-
tion" of the petition for certiorari filed on behalf of Mr.
Langley in the Supreme Court. In addition, Mr. Langley
had agreed not to participate in the proceedings of the
House and to resign immediately if his petition of certio-
rari were denied. This being the case, the committee
recommended no action be taken at the time. The
Supreme Court later denied the writ of certiorari, and
Langley promptly tendered his resignation as Repre-
sentative-elect on January 11, 1926.
The Langley case laid the predicate for what was later
to become House Rule XLIII, cl. 10:
A Member of the House of Representatives who
has been convicted by a court of record for the com-
mission of a crime for which a sentence of two or more
years' imprisonment may be imposed should refrain
from participation in the business of each committee
of which he is a member and should refrain from vot-
ing on any question at a meeting of the House, or of
the Committee of the Whole House, unless or until
judicial or executive proceedings result in reinstate-
ment of the presumption of his innocence or until he is
reelected to the House after the date of such
conviction.
This rule is inapplicable to a Member if the conviction is
overturned, the Member is pardoned, or is reelected to
the House after the conviction.
III. PROCEDURE
The issue of expulsion involves a question of privilege
which supersedes the regular order of business, and
resolutions to expel are privileged (see House Rule IX;
Cannon's, supra, vol. VI, sec. 236; and Hinds' Prece-
dents of the House of Representatives, vol. II, sec. 2648).
Debate is under the hour rule. A Member may be heard
in his own defense or to present a written defense, but
not to appoint another Member to speak on his behalf
(Hinds, supra, vol. II, 1273).
A resolution relating to expulsion can be of two types:
(1) a resolution to expel forthwith upon adoption by two-
thirds of those present and voting, or (2) a resolution
directing either a standing committee (i.e., Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct) or a special (select)
committee to investigate and recommend. Such an
investigating committee may be granted subpoena
power and may examine witnesses under oath.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO EXPULSION
The authority of the House of Representatives to cen-
sure a Member is derived from Art. I, sec. 5. cl. 2 of the
U.S. Constitution, as quoted earlier. The grounds under-
lying the consideration of a resolution to censure a Mem-
ber are based on (1) a breach of the rights of the House
collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its pro-
ceedings; and (2) a breach of the rights, reputation, and
conduct of Members, individually, in their representative
capacity only (Cannon's Procedure in the House of
Representatives, House Doc. 610, 87th Cong., p. 284;
and see House Rule IX). Between expulsion and cen-
sure, censure is the milder of the two, requiring a simple
majority vote (of those present and voting).
In recent times the House has resorted to less strin-
gent methods of punishing its Members for their impro-
prieties, when it did not conclude that expulsion or
censure was appropriate. Such alternative methods
include suspension of a Member's right to vote under
House Rule XLIII, cl. 10; imposition of fines; stripping of
committee chairmanships; reprimand, and rebuke by a
committee.
*Member of Virginia Bar. Former Assistant Director,





by J. Michael Dougherty, Jr.
On December 11, 1978, in Califano v. Aznavorian, 99
S.Ct. 471 (1978), the Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of §1611(f) of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. §1382(f)). Though §1611(f)
denies benefits to Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
recipients for any month that the recipient spends entire-
ly outside of the United States, the Court concluded that
the provision was not an impermissible burden on the
right of international travel as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.
On July 21, 1974, Grace Aznavorian, a United States
citizen and a recipient of SSI benefits,i left the United
States and traveled to Guadalajara, Mexico, where she
sought medical attention. Aznavorian remained in Mexi-
co until September 1, 1974 due to an unexpected illness.
As a result of this sojourn, HEW denied Aznavorian SSI
benefits for the months of August and September pur-
suant to § 1611(f) of the Social Security Act. Section 1611
(f) provides that:
[N]o individual shall be considered an eligible indivi-
dual for purposes of this Title for any month during all
of which such individual is outside the United States
... For purposes of the preceding sentence, after an
individual has been outside the United States for any
period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as
remaining outside the United States until he has been
in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive
days.
After exhausting her administrative remedies,
Aznavorian filed a class action2 asserting that §1611(f)
denied her the Fifth Amendment guarantees of due pro-
cess, equal protection and the right of international
travel.
The District Court for the Southern District of Califor-
nia granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class.
To become eligible for benefits under the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program, a person must be a resident of the United
States, 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(1)(b); be over 65 years old or meet
statutory definitions of blindness and disability, 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a); and be poor, 42 U.S.C. §1382a (income), 42 U.S.C.
§1382b (resources). 99 S.Ct. at 472.
The class was limited to those who had presented unsuccessful
claims to the Secretary of HEW. Based on § 1611(f), the Secretary
approximated that "between 4,823 and 9,195 persons were de
prived of their SSI benefits per month from February to October,
1976." Aznouorion v. Califuno, 440 F-Supp. 788, 793 (S.D.Cal.
1977).
